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Defanging Environmental Law: Extracting




The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered whether Congress can
authorize suits by private parties against states in federal court in light
of the 11 th amendment. In a 5-4 decision, the Court determined that
federal legislation enacted under the Constitution's Interstate Commerce
Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause cannot override state immunity
granted by the Eleventh Amendment absent clear consent from the
state.' Although Seminole Tribe v. Florida arose because of a dispute
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),2 it has a major affect
on several areas of federal law where private enforcement is an integral
part of the regulatory scheme. Such areas include environmental
protection, occupational safety, consumer protection, as well as patent
and trademark law.'
" Captain, United States Air Force; Deputy Regional Environmental Counsel (Eastern
Region), United States Air Force; LL.M. 1995, George Washington University; J.D. 1990,
Hamline University; B.A. 1987, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122, 1133 (1996).
2 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2721 (1994 & Supp. I 1996). Congress passed the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988 to provide a basis for the operation and regulation of gaming by
Indian Tribes. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1119. The Act divides gaming into three classes,
providing a different regulatory scheme for each class. Under the Act, Indian tribes are allowed
to conduct certain gaming activities in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the
state where the gaming activities are located. Id. States are required to negotiate in good faith with
a tribe to form a compact, and the Act allows tribes to sue a state in federal court in order to compel
performance of the duties created thereunder. In the Seminole Tribe case, Florida moved to dismiss
the Seminole Tribe's complaint on the ground that the suit violated Florida's sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court. Id. at 1121.
In Seminole Tribe, Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent,
The majority's opinion does not simply preclude Congress from establish-
ing the rather curious statutory scheme under which Indian tribes may seek
the aid of a federal court to secure a State's good faith negotiations over
gaming regulations. Rather, it prevents Congress from providing a federal
forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in
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This Article emphasizes how the decision directly threatens
environmental enforcement and citizen suit provisions. The most
notable laws that will be affected include the Clean Air Act,4 the Clean
Water Act,5 the Endangered Species Acte, the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA),7 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA),8 the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA),9 and other laws that contain citizen suit
provisions providing private action against state and local governments
failing to comply with federal regulations.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Seminole Tribe may
mean that an action taken against a state through a citizen suit provision
is now unconstitutional because Congress may not waive a state's
inherent Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity." The Supreme
copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental
law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.
Id. at 1134 (footnote omitted).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7671 (1994). Under the Clean Air Act citizen suits are authorized
under 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
1 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1387 (1994). Under the Clean Water Act, citizen suits are
authorized under 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
6 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 to 1544 (1994). Under the ESA, citizen suits are authorized under 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g).
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2692 (1994). Under the TSCA, citizen suits are authorized under
15 U.S.C. § 2619.
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675 (1994). Under CERCLA, citizen suits are authorized under
42 U.S.C. § 9659.
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to 6992k (1994). Under RCRA, Citizen suits are authorized under 42
U.S.C. § 6972. Citizen suit provisions in other environmental laws include: Act to Prevent
Pollution of Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1910 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(j)(8)
(1994); Public Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1994); Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911
(1994); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994); Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1994); Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8435 (1994); and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (1994). Although pesticide exposure is an area of large concern in
environmental regulation, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act does not contain
a citizen suit provision. See 7 U.S.C.§ 136 (1994).
0 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996). Chief Justice Rehnquist said that
Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity under only two Constitutional provisions: Section Five
of the 14th Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Id. at 1125. The latter authority
came from a plurality decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality
opinion). Incidentally, Union Gas was a Superfund case and, according to the majority, a
separation from established federalism jurisprudence. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127. The
majority said Union Gas was an erroneous decision and expressly overruled it. Id. at 1131.
Accepting an analogy that the Indian Commerce Clause is similar to the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the court found that the Eleventh Amendment restricts judicial power under Article III, and
Congress cannot use its Article I power to circumvent those limits. Id. at 1128.
EXTRACTING CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS
Court has effectively disabled Congress' initiative to privatize the
enforcement of federal environmental laws at a time when federal
enforcement funds are low and centralized federal bureaucracy is high.
Seminole may free states from the burden of citizen enforcement of
federal regulations, but what about equal application of the law between
state and local governments as well as individuals, corporations and the
federal government? One can imagine the potential consequences of
this decision under C ERCLA. The ruling will prevent a corporation or
federal agency from seeking federal court resolution of a liability-
apportionment dispute with a state that is among the parties responsible
for a site's contamination. The decision may increase the burden of
cleanup costs on private parties and federal agencies and reduce such
costs to state governments in cases where they share responsibility.
Essentially, states will not be forced to pay their share if no objective
forum exists for compliance and enforcement.
This Article will begin with a discussion of the importance of
citizen suit provisions in environmental enforcement. An analysis of
Seminole Tribe and the implications the decision will have on citizen
suit provisions is provided in Part II. Part III will discuss the history of
error the Supreme Court used as jurisprudence for the decision. Finally,
Part IV illustrates the future of environmental enforcement with
alternatives and suggestions to prevent further erosion of an already
threatened area of law.
I. THE VALUE OF CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS
A. Citizen Suits and Public Policy
To create an effective system of environmental enforcement,
Congress developed the citizen suit action, which permits private
citizens to take action against violators of environmental laws in federal
court. The Supreme Court initially favored the legislation by applying
a broad and liberal interpretation of the citizen suit provisions offering
standing to parties that did not have a personal interest. For example,
in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., I
" 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Court granted standing to a special interest group to bring suit
against a nuclear power company attempting to limit liability in the event of a disaster. The Court
found a "distinct and palpable injury" to the special interest group and "likelihood of redress" by
judicial intervention, where previously such a minor injury would not have been sufficient to grant
standing. Id. at 72-78.
1996-97]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
standing was granted to a special interest group that experienced no
injury or loss. 2 In previous cases, the Supreme Court denied standing
under similar circumstances. 3 The Supreme Court recognized that for
citizen suits to be an effective enforcement tool, liberal interpretations
and liberal standards for standing were necessary. Notwithstanding the
need for liberal judicial decisions, federal enforcement resources were
also a compelling interest.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is equipped to
enforce a large number of federal environmental laws. However, EPA
has been hit with large funding and personnel cuts under the current
administration and lacks the ability to effectively enforce these laws.' 4
Cognizant that under-enforcement of environmental laws would be a
problem, Congress added citizen suit provisions to many federal
environmental laws. Some legislators viewed the provisions as an
improvement to the under-enforcement dilemma. 5 Others saw private
enforcement actions as an imposition on judicial resources. Commenta-
tors also disagree in their views on the value of citizen suit provisions.
Private enforcement can be a dangerous intrusion on a state's sovereign
authority or it can be an effective enforcement device enhancing public
involvement and ultimately providing an effective enforcement
mechanism. 6
Criticism of citizen suit action is not difficult to find. Citizen
enforcement has been described as "ill designed and part of an
2 Id. at 75.
Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-36 (1972) (group interested in environmental
conservation in parks denied standing to stop construction of a resort in the Mineral King Valley).
" Full enforcement has never been economically feasible for EPA. However, EPA, like
many federal agencies, is burdened with excessive statutory requirements and political restraints.
These burdens make it less than effective in achieving optimal enforcement. See Barry Boyer &
Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits
Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 833, 880-95 (1985).
'5 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 at 226 (1974). In the September 21, 1970 Senate
debates, Senator Muskie noted the inadequate enforcement on the state and local levels and stressed
the need for more enforcement tools. Id.
6 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 14, at 880-95. Professors Boyer and Meidinger argue that
Congressional delegation of environmental enforcement is as suspicious as delegating rulemaking
power because a private citizen is empowered with authority without political accountability. Id.
at 842. "To the extent that regulation serves 'the people' rather than 'the industry' or the 'the
bureaucrats,' it gains legitimacy." Id. at 843. As a result, regulation in the control of industry or
bureaucrats is unfavorable in comparison to regulation in control of the public. Viewed as a
legitimating device, private enforcement can then be an effective method to initiate regulation from
the people. Id.
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uncoordinated enforcement scheme that distorts environmental
regulation by over-enforcement of some environmental laws, and that
results in an off budget entitlement program for a particular constitu-
ency."'17 In addition, the constitutional problems with the Congressional
grant of enforcement authority to private citizens are notable. The
Executive power to enforce laws under Article 11 is undermined by a
citizen grant of regulatory authority.'" Congress also is permitted to
illicitly appropriate power in violation of the Appointments Clause. 9
Finally, Congress can grant itself the power to allow citizen suit actions
that are not "Cases" or "Controversies" as otherwise required under
Article Ill.20
" Eileen Guana, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on
the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOL. L. QUART. 1, 42 (1995); see also Michael S. Greve,
The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TuL. L. REv. 339, 385 (1990). Greve argues
that citizen suit provisions are too over-reaching, resulting in more costs than benefits. Further,
citizen enforcers are not accountable like public enforcers are, and there is a tendency for over-
enforcement. Id. at 344. One example of over-enforcement of a statute is in the prosecution of
permit violations under the Clean Water Act, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) program. Since NPDES violations are generally easy to prove, defendants have strong
economic incentives to settle for less than the penalties a court might impose. Many settlements
stipulate that the award be donated to programs funding environmental improvement instead of the
U.S. Treasury. Greve argues that Clean Water Act citizen suits have led to over-enforcement of
the NPDES permit program while subsidizing national environmental groups.
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The President is constitutionally charged with the duty to
prosecute for the public. Although Congress sets priorities, methods and rules for enforcement, the
Executive office must administer the laws. The Supreme Court has determined that the executive
prosecutorial authority is undermined when private citizen suits impermissibly threaten the ability
of the Executive to retain "sufficient control" over that prosecutorial power. The power is
threatened by removing discretion and control from the Executive. Charles S. Abell, Note,
Ignoring the Treesfor the Forests: How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates
the Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REv. 1957, 1967-68 (1995).
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The appointments Clause gives the Executive Office the
power to appoint any Officer of the United States whose appointment is not already provided,
thereby giving the Executive a vehicle to exercise authority over prosecutorial powers. Id. Private
citizens are not exempt from this clause. However, in suing under citizen suit provisions for
damages to the United States, citizens are exercising executive authority authorized only by
appointment. Since citizens are not given appointments to prosecute and Congress is prohibited
from authorizing appointments, citizen suits are contrary to constitutional intent. Abell, supra note
18, at 1973-74. See also Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991) (noting that the
Appointments Clause functions to combat "the danger of one branch's aggrandizing its power at
the expense of another branch.").
20 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III says judiciary is restricted to hearing only "Cases"
and "Controversies." Standing has insured that the judiciary comply with this constitutional
requirement. The Supreme Court requires that a potential plaintiff have injury-in-fact, causal
connection to the defendant's action, and redressability to have standing. Abell, supra note 18, at
1978-79. Although citizen suit provisions are a standing attempt, Congress may not legislate in
order to force the judiciary to hear cases that do not fit the constitutional definition. Id.
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Citizen suit provisions have not evolved to the point where
individuals can recover damages for pursuing action for violation of an
environmental law. Instead, they provide injunctive relief, and in
limited cases, penalties to be paid to the United States Treasury. 2'
Citizen suits are idealistic from the view that they are initiated by a
morally conscious public that perceives its actions as being good for the
environment or public health. However, a review of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act or the Clean Water Act can quickly
discourage the benevolent enforcer. The complexity of the subject
matter in some cases demands legal and technical expertise, as well as
a wealth of resources to reasonably support an action. The potential
citizen-enforcer must determine if the effort is worth the goal.
Citizen suit provisions do not obligate an individual seeking
enforcement to prosecute violators in any particular manner. Further,
there is no governmental oversight of the action. Private enforcement
can mean that some communities have the benefit of public and private
enforcement resources while other communities must rely solely upon
public enforcement of environmental laws.22 This concept introduces
environmental racism into the equation. In theory at least, it is possible
for private enforcers to skew enforcement and exacerbate the effects of
environmental racism by prosecuting violations or challenging agency
inaction that affect only affluent, predominantly white communities.
Some authors suggest that given the increasing evidence that
minority and low income communities suffer disproportionately greater
environmental hazards, it is important to determine whether the scheme
of private enforcement contributes indirectly to unequal environmental
protection, and whether it can provide a means to address environmen-
tal inequities. 3 It is difficult to measure the incidence of citizen suit
action among affluent white communities in comparison to minority or
21 Environmental citizen suit provisions typically do not allow damages. However, they do
allow an injunction, and in limited cases, penalties to be paid to the United States. See e.g., Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (allowing for injunctive relief); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (allowing
for injunctive relief); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (allowing for injunctive relief).
CERCLA does allow penalties. 42 U.S. C. § 9659(c). Traditionally, the judiciary has also been
reluctant to provide a common law avenue for the collection of damages. See, e.g., Commerce
Holding Co., Inc. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding no private action for
damages is available under RCRA); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding no private action for damages exists under the Clean Water Act).
22 Guana, supra note 17, at 4.
23 Id.
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low income communities.24 However, current trends in the judiciary
and the focus on the environmental justice cause would lead one to
conclude that minority and low income communities are not represented
well in environmental citizen suit actions.25 Regardless how the
dilemma is interpreted, citizen suits should remain a vital part of
enforcement of environmental laws.
Citizen suit provisions are commonly considered as conferring
"private attorney general status on individuals in the public."26 Private
enforcers are granted prosecutorial authority to charge violators of
environmental laws, as well as public officials who do not appropriately
execute the enforcement duties. For example, a private individual may
file an enforcement action against an EPA Regional Administrator for
failure to execute duties required by regulation." This example
illustrates an interesting problem. Like many duties of public officials,
EPA Regional Administrators' duties are often discretionary. As a
result, enforcement against public officials is difficult. Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court espouse the idea that federal or state
government agencies should have unlimited discretion in their enforce-
ment policies. Simply because the government takes action to stop the
violation does not prevent exposure to a private citizen suit." Although
a limited number of statutes provide judicial review of an EPA
24 Id. Plaintiffs are not required to provide demographic information regarding the subject
area of the suit to complete a notice for suit. See40 C.F.R. § 135.3 (1996) (contents of notice under
Clean Water Act); Id. at § 254.3 (1996) (contents of notice under RCRA).
23 Guana, supra note 17, at 5.
26 A plaintiff suing under an environmental citizen lawsuit provision has been referred to as
a "private attorney general." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972).
2" The Mandamus and Venue Act provides a similar basis for jurisdiction to provisions
allowing suit against public officials for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. Federal district
courts may hear suits "in the nature of common law mandamus to compel an officer or employee
of the United States or an agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. §
1361 (1994).
2 Citizen suits should not always interfere with the discretionary authority provided to
government agencies. For example, when the government enters into a consent decree, the
agency's decision to execute the order should not be subject to citizen suit or judicial review. As
one author has noted:
Consent decrees are both contracts and final judicial orders. They contain
the EPA's allegations, . . . agreement to the jurisdiction of the court,
agreement that no finding of fact or ruling of law has been reached, a
schedule for compliance, aforce majeure clause, a termination date, and
agreed upon penalties for violating the decree.
Emily O'Connor, Note, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation -The End of Inquiry
or the Beginning of Confusion?, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1209, 1209 n.2. (1989).
1996-97]
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Administrator's actions,29 the agency is required to act reasonably under
the circumstances to gain compliance and diligently prosecute. Where
EPA fails to meet these requirements, citizen suits will serve as a
supplement to the government action. The citizen suit serves as a
"check and balance" in the environmental enforcement plan.
Environmental citizen suit provisions have not paved the way for
private individuals to bring suit against violators or public officials
without cause. A review of the provisions would indicate there are
sufficient limitations and procedural requirements to ensure citizen
enforcement actions contribute to rather than present an obstacle to
effective public enforcement of environmental laws. Although the
limitations and procedural requirements vary according to the statute
and whether the suit is against a polluter or public official, there is a
concern that these are the types of limitations that prevent low income
and minority groups from having access to representation in the
environmental arena. When objectively reviewed from an environmen-
tal justice perspective, these limitations inhibit private enforcement
actions that could moderate the inequality in environmental protection.3"
B. A Historical Perspective
Since the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments,3 citizen suit provisions
have been added to nearly every major environmental statute. Where
Congress has not explicitly created a citizen suit provision, courts
consistently interpret environmental statutes to include a right for
plaintiffs to sue based on the Congressional intent to guarantee
29 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (allowing review
of Administrator's promulgation of standards and limitations and review of denial or issuance of
permits).
" Guana, supra note 17, at 43-4. Communities of color, as well as those with low income,
tend to have less education, resulting in less access to technical knowledge of environmental
matters and the administrative processes necessary to effectuate a citizen enforcement suit. Further,
financial resources are generally not available to these groups in comparison to affluent,
predominantly white communities. It follows that the more complicated, technical, and time-
consuming a case is, the more an underfinanced community group will be at a disadvantage.
Prosecuting complicated environmental actions requires expensive expert testimony and substantial
discovery and analysis of highly technical and scientific matters. Environmental cases are typically
prosecuted only by large, national environmental special interest groups that have the economic
and academic resources to support an environmental enforcement suit. Greve, supra note 17, at
369-70.
3 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84. Stat. 1676 to 1713
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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enforcement.32 Although citizen suits have proven particularly useful
to environmentalists, they have been troublesome to the courts.
33
The first environmental citizen suit provision appeared in the Clean
Air Act (CAA) Amendments of 1970. Introduced in the Senate, the
provision granted the ability for individuals to enforce the Act in
Federal forums.34 The Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution
expressed concerns that Federal agencies could not effectively
administer and enforce environmental laws.35 The CAA citizen suit
provision and its purpose was embodied in § 304 of the final Senate
bill.36 The Committee report reiterated the Subcommittee's language
when giving the reason for including the citizen suit provision: "The
proposed legislation emphasizes the need to accelerate enforcement
action. To assure that Federal and State agencies aggressively pursue
their responsibilities, and to supplement their capacities, the bill
provides a right to seek enforcement of the provisions of the act."37
Some representatives in the Senate showed concern that citizens might
become too zealous and initiate frivolous suits.3" Such fears, however,
were rejected with the finding that enforcement of citizen suit provi-
sions should be unconstrained, and that the judiciary should not hesitate
to consider them in the course of their business since other federal
agencies were slow in their attempts to curb pollution.39 The Commit-
tee finalized by adding citizen suits would be a valued "public service"
to the United States.40 Citizen suit provisions would become so
" See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding
petitioners entitled to judicial review of decision to put a highway through inner-city park, despite
lack of an express right to sue in the statute).
"' Over the last few years, the courts have shown an increasing hostility to environmental
suits. As Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent in Lujan, "I have difficulty imagining this Court
applying its rigid principles ofgeographic formalism anywhere outside the context of environmen-
tal claims." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 595 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
He further characterized the opinion as "a slash-and-bum expedition through the law of
environmental standing." Id. at 606.
3' S.3546, 91stCong.,2ndSess. §4(13)(1970).
3' The Subcommittee was particularly concerned that the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) could not enforce the Clean Air Act of 1966, and the failure to generate regulations
by the statutory deadline regarding permissible levels of pollutants. Amendments to the clean Air
Act of 1966: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee
on Public Works, S. 3229, S. 3466, andS. 3546, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 85-86 (1970) (statement of
Senator Dole, sponsor of S. 3546).
36 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. § 4 (1970).
S' 5. REP. No. 91-1196, at 3 (1970).
Si Id. at 36-38.
3I Id. at 37.
40 Id. at 38.
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common and evolved that by the time the Endangered Species Act was
drafted, the concept of citizen enforcement was well received with little
attention in the congressional record.4
The citizen suit provisions were drafted to allow citizen enforce-
ment where a government agency is not diligently prosecuting an action
for a violation.42 Any person can initiate a citizen enforcement action
against a public official or polluter to compel compliance with an
applicable environmental law.43 Generally a citizen must first provide
at least a 60 day notice regarding the violation to both the state and
EPA. " Because of the extensive regulatory nature of permits under
programs like RCRA or the Clean Water Act, they are popular weapons
for citizen suit enforcement actions. For example, the Clean Water Act
best describes the limitations of a citizen suit action. Section 1365(b)
" See H.R. REP. No. 93-412 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 93-740 (1972); S. REP. NO. 93-307
(1972).
42 RCRA, Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act citizen enforcement actions are precluded if
the EPA Administrator or a state official is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a federal or state
court. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(B); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C.§ 7604(b)(I)(B). Actions
under RCRA must seek compliance with permits, standards, regulations, conditions, requirements,
prohibitions, or orders, or must be against any person who is handling or has handled, stored,
treated, transported, or disposed of"any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment"; or must be against the Administrator
for not diligently performing his duties. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(A)-(B). Clean Water Act and
Clean Air Act actions must seek compliance with standards, limitations, or orders, or must be
against the Administrator for failing to diligently perform his duties; or be for failure to obtain or
obey a permit for construction of a major emissions facility. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(i)(B); 42 U.S.C
§ 7604.
4' The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), states that "any citizen," may bring action,
while the Clean Air Act. RCRA and CERCLA all use the phrase "any person" in their citizen suit
provisions. 42- U.S.C. § 7604(a); 42 U.S.C § 6972(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a). Enforcement actions
under the Clean Water Act are for effluent standard violations. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). Enforcement
actions under the Clean Air Act are for emission standard, limitation, or order violations. 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1). Enforcement actions under RCRA are for permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition or order violations. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(A). RCRA also
allows action against persons "contributing to" the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste that present an imminent and substantial endangerment
to human health or the environment. Id. § 6972(a)(1 XB). Enforcement actions under CERCLA
may be pursued for violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order. 42
U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1).
44 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6072(b) (requiring 60 day notice for RCRA enforcement suits unless
the suit concerns hazardous waste management); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (requiring 60 day notice for
Clean Air Act enforcement suits unless the suit concerns hazardous air pollutant standards
violations and violations of SIP compliance orders); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(1) (requiring 60 day
notice for CERCLA enforcement suits); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (requiring 60 day notice for Clean
Water Act enforcement suits unless the suit concerns new source standards or toxic and
pretreatment standards).
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of the Act restricts private enforcement when the state or EPA Adminis-
trator diligently prosecutes a civil or criminal court action against the
violator." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) extends the restriction to situations
where the Administrator is diligently prosecuting the violator under a
comparable state law. 6 These requirements essentially forbid citizen
suits when they interfere with adequate, ongoing government attempts
to stop violations. Referring specifically to the Clean Water Act, the
Supreme Court agreed with this viewpoint, stressing the most important
purpose of citizen suits is to stop present violations of environmental
laws." Where the government is already adequately addressing these
violations, citizen enforcement actions serve no useful purpose.4
II. SEMINOLE TRIBE v. FLORIDA
In Seminole Tribe,49 the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
Congress can authorize suits by private parties against states in federal
court in light of the Eleventh Amendment. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
determined that federal legislation enacted under the Constitution's
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause 0 cannot
override state immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment absent
clear consent from the state.5 ' As suggested in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., the Indian Commerce clause and the Interstate Commerce
Clause are indistinguishable in terms of the amount of power they
confer upon Congress. 2
45 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate,
949 F.2d 552 (lst Cir. 1991) (holding that a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act is barred by a
State's diligent enforcement action).
46 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6).
47 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) states that any citizen may bring action against an individual
alleged "to be in violation" of the Clean Water Act See Gwaltney of Smithfield, LTD. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987) (holding that citizen suits address only
continuing or intermittent violations rather than wholly past violations).
4' Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. at 60 n.3.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
'0 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
" Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996).
52 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in
part) (noting that "As suggested above, if the Article I Commerce Power enables abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity, so do all of the other Article I powers.").
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Although Seminole Tribe arose because of a dispute under the
IGRA,53 the decision has direct application to state sovereign immunity
in environmental citizen suit provisions. Congress passed the IGRA in
1988 to regulate gaming on Indian lands. Gaming is separated into
three classes under the Act with each class regulated with a different
scheme. 4 Class III is the subject of Seminole Tribe, and includes the
most popular gaming activities such as slot machines, casino games,
banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries." In order for a tribe to
operate Class III gaming, a negotiated compact must be reached by the
tribe and state.56 If the state does not fulfill the obligation to "negotiate
with the Indian tribe in good faith," then the IGRA provides for judicial
enforcement under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) and (B)(i),57 under which the
Tribe can sue the State for failure to negotiate with it in good faith.
In Seminole Tribe, the Florida Seminole Indian Tribe filed suit
against the State of Florida alleging lack of good faith negotiation. The
State of Florida then moved to dismiss the Tribe's complaint but was
53 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2721. In the Seminole Tribe case, Florida moved to dismiss the
Seminole Tribe's complaint on the ground that the suit violated Florida's sovereign immunity from
suit in federal court. Seminole Tribe, 116 S.D. at 1117.
Class I gaming includes "social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional
forms of Indian ,gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal
ceremonies or celebrations." 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). This type of gaming is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Indian tribe. Id. § 2710(a)(1). Class II gaming includes games like bingo, card
games and nonbanking card games that are not illegal under the laws of the state. Id. § 2703(7).
Regulation of class II gaming requires that the state permit such activity. Id. § 2710(b)(1). Class
II also contemplates a federal role, but places primary emphasis on tribal self-regulation. Id. §
2710(c)(3)-(6). Class III is the subject of the Seminole case and includes slot machines, casino
games, banking card games, dog racing and lotteries. Id. § 2703(8). Class III is the most heavily
regulated, requiring that tribes fulfill very specific requirements under section 2710. One of those
requirement is that the gaming conform with the requirements of a negotiated compact between the
tribe and state. Id. § 2710(d)(1).
"5 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).
6Id. § 2710(d)(1).
17 The sections read:
(A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over-(i) any
cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State
to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering
into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such
negotiations in good faith ...
(B)(i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in subpara-
graph (A)(i) only after the close of the 180-day period beginning on the
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denied at the district court level.5" Florida sought an interlocutory
appeal of the decision and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that the suit violated Florida's sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court.59 Consistent with the district court opinion,
the court decided that § 27 10(d)(7) of the IGRA was passed pursuant to
congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause, and the
section was intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity.' The court
disagreed that the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the power
to abrogate immunity from suit, and concluded that there was no
jurisdiction over the suit. Finally, the court determined that Ex parte
Young does not allow an Indian Tribe to compel good faith negotiations
by suing a state official. The court of appeals then remanded the case
to the district court with instructions to dismiss because of the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.6' The Florida Seminole Tribe subsequently
petitioned the Supreme Court for review.
In affirming the decision to dismiss, the Supreme Court overruled
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,62 and determined that Congress cannot
abrogate state Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under the
Indian Commerce Clause.63 The Supreme Court examined two issues:




62 Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion). Union Gas was a third party claim to
recover costs of hazardous waste cleanup, in which the Supreme Court determined that the
provisions of CERCLA clearly intend to hold states liable for damages in federal court. Id.
Further, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not preclude Congress from enacting a
statute that permits suits against states in federal court. The Supreme Court expressly overruled
Union Gas in Seminole Tribe. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 (1996).
63 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133. The Petitioner in Seminole Tribe argued that federal
jurisdiction may be exercised to compel the formation of an IGRA pact by bringing suit against
Florida's Governor under the Exparte Young doctrine. Id. at 1119. The Court determined that the
doctrine of Ex parte Young could not apply since there were alternative remedial provisions of
IGRA providing relief. In Exparte Young, the Court held that federal jurisdiction may be asserted
in a suit against a state official where prospective injunctive relief is sought to end a "continuing
violation of federal law." Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908), overruled in part by
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1973). IGRA states that Indian gaming activities must comply
with a valid compact that is negotiated between the state and the tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX1)(C).
If the state does not negotiate in good faith to form a mutually beneficial compact, the tribe may
bring suit in federal court to compel performance. Id. § 2710(d)(7). Sections 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)-
(vii) describe an elaborate remedial scheme designed to insure the formation of a compact. In
Seminole Tribe, the Court concluded that the remedial scheme under IGRA effectively replaced the
need for any action under Exparte Young: "Where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial
scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate
before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon
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1) does the Eleventh Amendment allow Congress to authorize suits
against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause;"M and 2) does the
doctrine of Ex parte Young permit suits against a state official for
prospective injunctive relief. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Seminole Tribe declares that the Indian Commerce Clause
did not grant Congress the power to abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity under the 11 th Amendment and Ex parte Young does not
permit an Indian tribe to force good faith negotiations by suing a state
official.6"
A. Does the Eleventh Amendment Prevent Congress from Authorizing
Suits by Citizens against States in Federal Jurisdictions?
Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment appears to restrict
only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Amendment to be much more
meaningful. For example, for over a century the Court has relied on the
decision in Hans v. Louisiana, where the Court decided that federal
jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States was not intended by
the Constitution.'M The Florida Seminole Indians argued that Congress
expressed an intent in the IGRA to abrogate state sovereign immunity.67
Exparte Young. " Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
" The Eleventh Amendment states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST., amend. XI.
65 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. Rehnquist said that Congress can abrogate sovereign
immunity under only two Constitutional provisions: Section Five of the 14th Amendment and the
Interstate Commerce Clause. Id.
I Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). The Seminole Tribe Court divided the Hans
opinion in two parts for purposes of supporting their conclusion. First, that each state is a sovereign
entity in our federal system; and second, that sovereign immunity inherently disallows a suit where
a state does not consent. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1129-31 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 8 1,
at 487 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)).
67 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123. The Court found that it was abundantly clear Congress
intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the IGRA. Id. at 1123-24. The Court applied
the test in Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991), which requires a "clear
legislative statement" from Congress that immunity is waived. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123.
The Court went on to say in Seminole Tribe that "we think that the numerous references to the
'State' in the text of § 2710(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended through the Act
to abrogate the States" sovereign immunity from suit. Id. at 1124.
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Whether Congress has the power to abrogate the 1 th amendment
sovereign immunity of a state is focused on constitutional provisions
granting Congress such power. The authority to abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity has been authorized under only two constitutional
provisions: the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 and the Interstate Commerce
Clause.69 In Seminole Tribe, however, the Court expressly overruled
the Union Gas analysis of Commerce Clause power because it "has
proven to be a solitary departure from established law."7
The Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments are inextricably at odds.
The Fourteenth Amendment arguably grants to Congress the power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,7 while the
Eleventh Amendment dictates that state sovereign immunity limits the
Article III power of the judiciary to subject the states to suit.72 The
Supreme Court addressed this issue squarely in Seminole Tribe. In the
past, the Court has held that Congress may abrogate state sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court if the abrogation is made "unmis-
takably clear" in the language of the statute. 73 The "unmistakably clear"
68 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (noting that Congress was granted
express authority, "by appropriate legislation," to limit State authority under Section Five of the
14th Amendment.).
" See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1984) (plurality opinion). Union Gas was
a plurality decision where the Court found that the power for Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity is derived from Congress' plenary power to regulate interstate commerce.
" Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996). In overruling Union Gas, the
Court offered the following rationale:
Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the
policies underlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to its
holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable
precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed
with the rationale of the plurality. ... Finally, both the result in Union Gas
and the plurality's rationale depart from our established understanding of the
Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted function of Article III. We
feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should
be, and now is, overruled.
Id. (citations omitted)
Ut .S. CONST., amends. XI, XIV.
72 U.S.CoNST. art. 3, § 1; amend. XI.
13 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989). Clear statement rules are becoming
burdensome and difficult to deal with in judicial and legislative communities. One author writes:
These rules are powerful. At their strongest, clear statement rules treat all
statutes as maintaining the status quo unless Congress clearly states its
contrary intention in the text of the statute. Because clear statement rules
"foreclose inquiry into extrinsic guides of interpretation," they eliminate any
need-or opportunity-to glean evidence from the structure, purpose, or history
of a statute to inform a determination about congressional intent. But the
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intent to abrogate Florida's sovereign immunity from federal suit was
demonstrated by the language in §27 10(d)(7)(A)(i). The provision says
jurisdiction shall vest in "the United States district courts... over any
cause of action . . . arising from the failure of a State to enter into
negotiations.., or to conduct such negotiations in good faith. '74 The
Court went on to say that the "numerous references to the 'state' in the
text of section 271 0(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended
through the Act to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit.
75
B. Can Sovereign Immunity be Abrogated Pursuant to a Valid Exercise
of Congressional Power?
Since the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the
rationale of the Court's conclusion in Seminole Tribe focused on
whether section five of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress
to abrogate state sovereign immunity.76 In overruling Union Gas, the
court advanced the theory that state sovereign immunity embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment cannot be abrogated even when Congress has
exclusive control over the area of a suit pursuant to Commerce Clause
powers. The Court stated that
Court has vacillated regarding precisely what Congress must do to satisfy
clear statement rles. Sometimes broad general language suffices; sometimes
only a statement targeted at a specific problem is demanded. Sometimes the
court considers the text alone; sometimes it looks at other evidence of
congressional intent. The Court has not been consistent, nor has it explained
its different approaches; thus, it is little wonder that some commentators now
distinguish between ordinary clear statement rules and "super-strong" clear
statement rules.
John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity In an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis.
L. REv. 772-73 (1995).
7' 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
71 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124.
76 Id. at 1125. The Court relied heavily on the analysis in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, where the
same question arose. In that case, the Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment had altered
the balance of power between state and federal government by intruding upon the province of the
Eleventh Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) The Court held that section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly provided Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." See id. at 453. It plainly interpreted the Amendment to
allow Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. The Court had a somewhat contrary and
more curious holding inAtascadero, where it determined that Congress may not abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity by conditioning federal aid to states on their waiver of sovereign immunity.
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985).
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[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-
making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amend-
ment prevents Congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against nonconsenting States. The Eleventh Amend-
ment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article
I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction.77
After a long dissertation of constitutional analysis beginning with
Hans, the Court conceded that, except for Union Gas, it had never
before applied Eleventh Amendment principles to the issue of whether
Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.7 8
In determining if the doctrine of Ex parte Young permits suits
against state officials for prospective injunctive relief, the Court
confirmed that Ex parte Young may not be used where Congress has
already created an enforcement scheme under the statute.7 9 In suits
against federal officers, the Court refused to supplement a remedial
scheme with one created by the judiciary.80 Ex parte Young provides
support to the argument that the Eleventh Amendment does not confer
to states broad immunity from suit."'
In Young, the Minnesota attorney general was denied a petition for
release from the U.S. Marshal's custody by the circuit court.82 On
appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the circuit court had
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116S Ct. 1114, 1131-32(1996).
I Id. at 1129. The Court stated that "It is true that we have not had occasion previously to
apply established Eleventh Amendment principles to the question whether Congress has the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity (save Union Gas). But consideration of that question must
proceed with fidelity to this century-old doctrine." Id. The Court made an interesting admission
that there is little common law foundation to support the conclusion that Congress does not have
the power to abrogate sovereign immunity. Then, In the next sentence, the Court insulted the
dissent for lacking authority for its opinion by saying,
[t]he dissent... disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled
together from law review articles and its own version of historical
events. The dissent cites not a single decision since Hans (other than
Union Gas) that supports its view of state sovereign immunity, instead
relying upon the now-discredited decision in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1129-30.
'9 Id. at 1132.
I ld.
" Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 140 (1908), overruled inpart by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1973).
82 Id. at 126-27, 168.
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power to detain him for contempt because of the Eleventh
Amendment. 3 The Court held that states could be sued when the action
is brought against a state official, and a party is seeking prospective
injunctive relief for a violation of federal law."
Exparte Young shares a close association with Monaco v. Missis-
sippi.8 5 Both cases appear to be premised on the idea that congress
cannot create private causes of action against nonconsenting states.8 6
At the same time, however, they respect that public officials may be
compelled to execute their official duties where remedial schemes exist.
Seminole Tribe supports this conclusion. 7
I1. THE LEGACY OF ERROR
The Seminole Tribe Court relied heavily on jurisprudence that is
closely rooted to English common law. As a result, the Court arrived
at an erroneous decision. The concept of sovereignty evolved from
English common law, which assumed that the "king could do no
wrong," and therefore could not be sued without his consent.88 Because
of close association to the English crown, the United States adopted the
13 Id. at 134, 145.
14 id. at 159-60.
85 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (holding that foreign nationals cannot sue States in federal courts).
11 See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction ofan Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1089 (1983).
" Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996).
s Michael D. Axline et al., Stones for David's Sling: Civil Penalties In Citizen Suits Against
Polluting Federal Facilities, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 17 n.81 (1987). Whether sovereign
immunity really existed in English common law and Feudal systems is a subject of debate.
Subjects of the crown could take action against the monarchy with consent, which was regularly
granted as a matter of course. Doyle Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment. Adoption and Interpreta-
tion, 2 GA. L. REv. 207, 209 (1968). By the 17th century, the petition of right allowed suits against
the King, the government and its representatives. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in
Torts, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 7, 16, 22-4 (1924). American colonists refused to accept the doctrine of
governmental immunity in their initial efforts to organize the United States. John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889,
1897 (1983). The 1620 Charter of New England established the first political and corporate body
with "full power and lawful authority .... to sue and be sued; to implead, and to be impleaded;
answer, and to be answered, unto all manner of Courts." Id. at 1896. Connecticut's Charter of 1662
and Rhode Island's Charter of 1663 both contained nearly identical language. Id Charters
governing Virginia, New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania all recognized that American colonists
ensured that suits could be taken against their governments to prevent abuse and protect the rights
of the people. See H. Stephen Harris & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence
After Atascadero: The Coming Clash W*ith Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes ofAction Over
Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645, 686-87 (1988).
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doctrine, imputing the king's sovereignty to the United States govern-
ment because it is an institutional descendant. 9 The doctrine was
supported by constitutional interpretation in McCulloch v. Maryland.
McCulloch is the landmark for the modem doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which precludes courts from enforcing judgments against the
federal government without consent. 90
A. The History and Intent of the Eleventh Amendment.
Ratified in 1794, the Eleventh Amendment was adopted only ten
months after the controversial decision in Chisholm v. Georgia9' was
delivered. The Chisholm court held that private citizens could bring
suit against a state in federal jurisdiction. 2 There is general agreement
that the Eleventh Amendment was passed as a knee-jerk reaction to the
Chisholm decision,93 but arguments become convoluted between jurists
and historians over the exact objections to Chisholm and the intent of
the Eleventh Amendment in remedying the dilemma two years after the
decision." By a vote of four to one the five Justices of the Supreme
Court clearly favored the notion that a state be subject to suit in a
federal forum.9 The result was carefully articulated and logically
detailed in separate opinions by each member of the Court on the basis
of American history and Constitutional foundation.96 However, for
reasons less clear, the Court dramatically shifted it's position and
embraced sovereign immunity in response to the ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment. In departing with the holding in Chisholm, the
, Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for
Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68
MICH. L. REV. 389, 396-97 n.38 (1970).
"o McColluch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (concluding that the states do not
have the power to interfere with the operation of federal law; holding specifically that the United
States is immune from taxation).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
92 Id. at 452.
9' See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV.
L. REv. 1342 (1989).
John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant? 87 NORTHwESTERN L. REv. 1121 (1993). In his
article, Justice Stevens correctly advances the doctrine that on the basis of the founding principles
of our country there is not only a responsibility to administer justice between private citizens, but
there is a unique responsibility for a democratic government to deliver judgment against itself,
when necessary, in favor of the people it serves. Id. at 1128-30.
" Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 453 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
Id. at 450-451,466,469,479 (Blair, Wilson & Cushing, JJ., and Jay, C.J., holding states
are subject to suit in federal court).
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Court reasoned in Cohens v. Virginia that sovereign immunity has
"always been treated as an established doctrine."97  This phrase
established a landmark that would send the Supreme Court into a long
and far-reaching tradition of error.
The various amendments that were proposed before the actual
Eleventh Amendment was adopted shed some light on the intent of the
Amendment's drafters. Two versions of the Eleventh Amendment were
proposed in the House of Representatives within two days of the
delivery of the Chisholm decision. The first proposed amendment read:
[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any
of the Judicial courts established or to be established under
the authority of the united States, at the suit of any person or
persons, citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic or
corporate whether within or without the United States.9"
The second proposed amendment read:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to
any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United State by citizens of another state, or by
citizens or subject of any foreign state.9
The Eleventh Amendment, as ratified, states: "The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one the of the United States
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or Subjects of any foreign
Nation." Read literally, the amendment prohibits suits in federal court
by citizens of one state against another. It does not prevent a citizen of
a state from suing the state where they reside. If it were the intent of the
drafters to preclude in-state citizens from suing a state in a federal
forum, then Congress would have more than likely entertained passing
the first proposed amendment, which contemplates prohibiting any
citizen from suing a state. The second proposed amendment and the
actual amendment are drafted from the perspective of limiting the scope
of the federal judiciary's power, and not in granting states broad
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
" C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 101(rev. ed. 1937).
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793). Both proposals were tabled and Congress adjourned.
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immunity. Justice Brennan commented on the differences in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon:
Had Congress desired to enshrine state sovereign immunity in
federal courts for all cases, for instance, it could easily have
adopted the first resolution introduced on February 19, 1793,
in the House. Alternatively, a strong sovereign immunity
principle could have been derived from an amendment that
merely omitted the last 14 words of the enacted resolution.
However, it does not take a particularly close reading of the
Eleventh Amendment to see that it stops far short of that ....
The congruence of language suggests that the Amendment was
intended simply to adopt the narrow view of the state-citizen
and state-alien diversity clauses; henceforth, a State could not
be sued in federal court where the basis of jurisdiction was that
the plaintiff was a citizen of another State or an alien.110
Historians generally agree that the outcry against the court's
decision in Chisholm was motivated by the financial dire straits of the
states after the Revolutionary War.' If the states were subject to suit
at this point in history, it would have put them at risk of financial
collapse."0 2 The Majority in Seminole Tribe failed to recognize that the
plain language of the Eleventh Amendment does not contemplate state
sovereign immunity from individual suit in federal forums, and the
framers of the Eleventh Amendment were concerned only with
10 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286-87 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
101 Id. at 258, 264. For an 11 th Amendment analysis, See Harris & Kenny, supra note 88, at
674-704 (1988); see also, Robert A. Wood, An Error In Eleventh Amendment Interpretation:
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & SewerAuthority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. 27 CREiGHTON L. REv. 477,484-
85, 492-94 (1994); Marshall, supra note 93, at 1345 (the Eleventh Amendment should be
interpreted based on it's plain language); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1988); Akhil Reid Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1426-27 (1987); Carol F. Lee, Sovereign
Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of History, 18 URB. LAW. 519, 521-22 (1986);
David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 61, 62-3 (1984); Gibbons, supra note 88, at 1889-2005; Fletcher, supra note 86, at 1036-37;
Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:
Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 682-
83(1976).
..2 See generally Marshall, supra note 93, at 1365.
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protecting state treasuries rather than granting complete sovereign
immunity from suit.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation
In Hans v. Louisiana,1°3 the Court relied on the rationale in
Chisholm with little justification. The Court stated, "It is not necessary
that we should enter upon an examination of the reason or expediency
of the rule which exempts a sovereign State from prosecution in a court
ofjustice at the suit of individuals .... It is enough for us to declare its
existence."'' " Even though the Eleventh Amendment says nothing
specifically about state sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court implied
that the Amendment encompassed certain attributes of sovereignty,
including state sovereign immunity."°5 The Court stated that permitting
an individual to bring action against a state in federal court would be
"an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of." 06
Decided in 1890, Hans was a suit brought against a state by a
private individual in a federal jurisdiction." 7 The Hans Court expanded
f03 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
'c, Id. at 21.
Io5 d.at 13. The historical evidence consisting partly of debates from state ratification
conventions, suggests that the authors of the Eleventh Amendment never intended to create a broad
power of sovereignty for the states. Instead, the evidence suggest that-the concerns were for the
protection of state treasuries that were depleted after the Revolutionary war. Justice Brennan
declared that the Eleventh Amendment taken on its plain language "simply ... (has] no
constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity." Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 259
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The Eleventh Amendment was drafted in response to growing pressure
on state treasuries after the Revolutionary War. The states feared British Creditors and American
Tories would attempt to bring suit to recover property confiscated during the war. Believing the
Amendment would protect them from these suits, the states were quick to begin ratification. The
motivation to pass the Eleventh Amendment was to protect state treasuries and not create an all-
encompassing principle of immunity from suit. Jack W. Pirozzolo, States Can Wait: The
Immediate Appealability ofOrders Denying Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 59 CHI. L. REv. 1617,
1635-37 (1992).
"0' Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 5 (1890). Referring to the force and meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment, the court cited Federalist Paper No. 81, which provides that "[tihe contracts
between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience for the sovereign, and have
no pretension to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign
will." Id.
Hans, 134 U.S. at 9. The plaintiff in Hans brought suit to collect state bonds issued in
1874, but later repudiated by the state by constitutional ratification in 1879. The plaintiff asserted
the cause of action arose under U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, while jurisdiction arose under U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2 and the Judiciary Act of 1875. Id. at 1-3.
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state sovereign immunity to suits brought by its own citizens""8 and
validated the Court's intentions to provide immunity to states subject to
suit in federal court, even where there is a federal question involved. 10
The Court explained that the Eleventh Amendment does not necessarily
prohibit suits against states brought in federal forums by a resident.
However, it was understood when the Amendment was ratified that
state sovereignty was a fundamental part of the Constitution. 10 The
Court conceded that the language of the Amendment was not broad
enough to contemplate a case like Hans because such a case would
have been "anomalous and unheard of' in 1794."
Since Hans, the Court has gradually abrogated state sovereign
immunity, ending with the controversial Union Gas decision. In the
century separating Hans from modem decisions, the Court has
gradually contracted the scope of the sovereign immunity doctrine and
the Eleventh Amendment while still refusing to abrogate them entirely.
In the period of time between the Hans and Union Gas decisions,
several other important decisions addressed the question of whether
Congress may abrogate state sovereignty immunity to subject states to
private suit in a federal forum. The two common themes addressed in
the line of cases are: 1) does the doctrine of sovereign immunity limit
Congressional power provided under the commerce clause; and 2) does
the doctrine limit Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Until Union Gas, the case of Parden v. Terminal Railway12 was the
only decision that held an individual could sue a state in a federal forum
based on consent and waiver. In Parden, the Court decided that the
state of Alabama had affirmatively waived its sovereign immunity
because it ratified the Constitution, granting Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce.' " The issue was not reviewed in the
Seminole Tribe decision, so the proposition that a state automatically
OI Id. at 15.
Id. at 20.
I d. at 16-7. Although the fHans Court evidently used English common law as a basis for
its decision, it nonetheless felt its interpretation of the 1 Ith Amendment was consistent with the
intent of authors. The Hans decision states the Court interpreted "the mere letter" of the
amendment in "light of history and experience and the established order of things." Id. at 13-4.
I Id.at 18.,
112 377 U.S, 184 (1964), overruled in part, Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub,
Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (in overruling Parden, the Court determined that abrogation of I
Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language).
"' Id. at 191.
1996-97]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
waives it's immunity to suit in federal courts by ratifying the Constitu-
tion is still open for review." 4 Since Pardon, Justice Brennan has
consistently dissented from decisions upholding Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity,"' forcing the Court onto a path leading to Union
Gas, and later Seminole Tribe, where eventually it would be required to
confront the issue of whether Congress has the constitutional authority
to waive a state's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.' 16
Two divergent cases were decided in the wake of Parden. In 1973,
the Court decided in Employees of the Department of Public Health &
Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare,"7 that while
congressional power to regulate commerce includes the power to
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, the congressional intent to do so
must be clearly and unequivocally stated."' Later in 1987, the Court
handed down a consistent decision in Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways & Public Transportation. The Court reasoned that even
though Congress may have the special power through the Commerce
Clause to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, it must specifically
express this intent in unmistakable language."19 The Court would
examine similar issues and maintain a similar holding in Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.1
20
14 Id. at 186-91.
"' Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (Brennan, J., delivering opinion of the
Court); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 126 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483
U.S. 468,496 (1987) (Brennan J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); Will
v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 321 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
..6 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For an analysis of the theory,
see generally, Amar, supra note 101; Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1977-78); Fletcher, supra note
86; Gibbons, supra note 88.
"? 411 U.S. 279(1973).
I d. at 285 (holding sovereign immunity was not waived and refusing to find the State of
Missouri liable to employees who sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
19 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987) (affirming dismissal of suit against the Texas Department of
Highways & Public Transportation by state employees under the Jones Act based on a lack of clear
expression on the part of Congress).
120 506 U.S. 139 (1993). In Puerto Rico Aqueduct, the Court declared that "[tihe Amendment
is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of
sovereignty, including sovereign immunity." Id. at 146. The Court also stated in the opinion that
this included "immunity from suit." Id. at 144.
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In Union Gas, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, confirmed
Justice Brennan's conclusion in Atascadero that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not grant broad sovereign immunity to the states, including
immunity from suit.' The decision in Union Gas represents the
culmination of a trend that began with Young, resulting in a radical, but
appropriate deviation from the doctrine of protecting state sovereign
immunity. In Union Gas, Pennsylvania moved to dismiss a third-party
suit for recovery of costs related to environmental clean-up. The motion
was granted by the District Court on the grounds that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the suit. 122 The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if Congress has
provided a specific and express intent in a statute to hold states liable,
then the Eleventh Amendment would not bar jurisdiction by the federal
courts.' In Union Gas, the Court determined that Congress had clearly
waived state sovereign immunity.'24
C. The Seminole Tribe Outcome
In articulating the arguments for Seminole Tribe, the Court was
very careful to draft a logical opinion. However, the Court made
comments that are not consistent with the historical foundation of this
country. For example, the Court stated in its decision that sovereign
immunity "serves to avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties."'25 This is one indication that the Court displaced any recollec-
tion of America's struggle for independence and the Constitution by
reverting their rationale to principles established in the English feudal
system. The Court subscribed to the postulate that monarchs are
answerable to God and not their subjects, and the fiction that the King
2 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 24 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that "The works of numerous
scholars have exhaustively and conclusively refuted that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a
general grant of Sovereign Immunity to the States, [and] further explication on this point is
unnecessary.").
z Id. at 5-6.
123 Id. at 6-7.
I2 /d. at 23-24 (Stevens, J., concurring).
125 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116S. Ct. 1114, 1124 (1996) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority, 506 U.S. at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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can do no wrong'1 6 In so doing, the Court offended fundamental values
of the American system of government.
In reflecting upon the principle of broad sovereign immunity, it is
critical to separate the long list of citations that follow Hans and return
to the basic and simple ideology of this country-that the state is not
sovereign, the people are. The state and her government are ultimately
subject to, and answerable to the people. The colonists rejected the
British Crown and the system of authoritarian power that it represented.
The Supreme Court cannot take this point lightly, but should look only
to the words of the Constitution's preamble, which begins with the
words "we the people," thus making clear that the citizenry-rather
than the state-is the true sovereign.
1 27
IV. THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
The language of the various environmental citizen suit provisions
appears to clearly waive sovereign immunity in favor of citizen
enforcement. However, the Seminole Tribe decision now places these
provisions in question. Citizen suit provisions in most environmental
laws are more or less similar to that in the Clean Water Act. That
statute says:
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution)
who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or
limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation ... The district courts shall have jurisdiction,
without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship
of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limita-
tion, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform
" See generally Stevens, supra note 94; Harris & Kenny, supra note 88; Wood, supra note
101.
127 Justice Wilson states in his decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
that, "[i]fthe word sovereign has any proper meaning it applies to every man," and Chief Justice
Jay's view that, "[iun this country, the people are the 'sovereigns without subjects."'
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such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title. 2 '
Based on the language, there can be little doubt that Congress intended
to waive the sovereign immunity of any "government instrumentality."
However, the phrase "to the extent permitted by the eleventh amend-
ment of the Constitution" is troublesome. The Seminole Tribe decision
indicates that the Constitution does not support congressional abroga-
tion of sovereign immunity.'29 By placing the foregoing phrase in the
language of the Clean Water Act and other Environmental laws,
Congress invited an attack on the validity of citizen suit provisions with
Seminole Tribe as leading authority.
Although Seminole Tribe is likely to be a major blow to environ-
mental protection, there are still methods to compel states to waive
sovereign immunity for enforcement purposes including the authority
of delegation. For example, the EPA is amending implementing
regulations for § 402 of the Clean Water Act. 3 ' The new regulation
would require states with § 402 programs to provide an avenue for state
judicial review of final permit decisions. The review must be sufficient
enough to "provide for, encourage, and assist public participation in the
permitting process."'' A state must provide an opportunity forjudicial
review at the state level that would be equivalent to that available at the
federal level. The rule is intended to fend off restrictive state standing
requirements that bar citizen suits, and ensure effective and meaningful
public participation in the permit issuance process by establishing a
minimum level of public participation among state water pollution
control programs.'32 The emphasis is on the ability of citizens to
challenge the permit problems in state court just as they would in
federal court. States failing to integrate the rule into their program face
disapproval of their NPDES programs and loss of funding. '"
States may argue on the basis of Atascadero that EPA's require-
ment to waive sovereign immunity to obtain approval of NPDES
programs is impermissible unless Congress has made its intent to do so
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1994).
' Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1126-28.
' 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
' Amendment to the Requirements for Authorized State Permit Programs Under Section 402
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unmistakably clear in the Clean Water Act. 134 Maintaining that the
Clean Water Act does not contain a clear intention to waive sovereign
immunity is at least arguable. Assuming for the moment that the
argument were true, the "clear statement rule" has limited application
where states voluntarily assume responsibility over NPDES programs.
There is no mandate in the Clean Water Act or regulations requiring
states to apply for approval of NPDES programs. Section 402 of the
CWA provides that states wishing to obtain authorization from EPA to
implement NPDES programs may apply to EPA. Where the require-
ments of section 402 are met, the state is granted approval of an
operating permit in lieu of federal participation. The most persuasive
element to note is that the state may decline the opportunity to imple-
ment the NPDES program and leave implementation to the federal
government at their option."'
Substituting similar provisions in other environmental laws would
increase the need for regulatory agencies to draft and implement such
regulations. Nonetheless, such provisions are effective in compelling
states to subject themselves to review by the public. In the wake of
Seminole Tribe, it is conceivable that these regulations will also be
found unconstitutional by the present Court. With the Seminole Tribe
decision, the Court has reconnected with a history of decisions that
slowly constructed a wall around broad-based state sovereign immunity.
It would not be surprising if the Court revisited the issue of sovereign
immunity in the future and determined that laws and regulations
confining states to federal regulation based on their "voluntary" waiver
of sovereign immunity are unconstitutional. Although this writer would
view the technique as effective "legislative leverage" that promotes
environmental enforcement, the Court might view it as unfair "legisla-
tive arm-twisting" and disallow such a maneuver.
A method of enforcement the Seminole Tribe decision specifically
left unaffected is the ability for citizens to bring action in federal court
' See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991).
s The Supreme court has held that Congress may offer the States the choice of regulating
an activity according to federal standards or having State law preempted by federal regulation. See
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (holding that Congress can use almost any
incentive short of outright coercion to prod states into adopting federal standards), and Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (holding that Congress
had not coerced States to participate in SMCRA, resulting in a failed 10th Amendment claim).
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against state officials for violation of federal laws. 36 In 1908, the court
in Ex parte Young '17sought to revive state accountability without
sacrificing the definition of state sovereignty. It successfully compro-
mised by permitting suit in federal court against a state official instead
of the state itself. The rationale being that an official whose actions
violated an individual's constitutional rights was acting ultra vires and
could not benefit from Eleventh Amendment immunity. 3 Although
suits for monetary damages remained barred, the decision supported
suits for prospective injunctive relief.'39 As a practical matter for
environmental enforcement, Citizens may also challenge agency action
under the APA, and have better success. However, such challenged
actions under Ex parte Young and the APA are subject to deferential
standards of review, such as the substantial evidence standard and the
arbitrary and capricious standard."4 Even if such actions are successful,
the groups typically must finance their own lawsuits, which presents an
obstacle to underfunded community groups.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has relied on a long history of error in reaching
their conclusion in Seminole Tribe. Ironically, at one point, the Majority
says the Dissent "disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled
together from law review articles and its own version of historical
events." That is an interesting point of criticism by a Court that just one
sentence before admits "[i]t is true that we have not had occasion
previously to apply established Eleventh Amendment principle to the
' The Court recognized that a plaintiff may take action in federal court against a state
official for prospective injunctive relief notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh
Amendment. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132 (1996). However, the Court also
reiterated its earlier decisions that the judiciary would not allow Ex parte Young actions where
Congress has already created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right.
Id. See also Schweiker v. Chilicky 487 U.S. 412,423 (1988) (refusing to extend additional Bivens
remedies where Congress had already created an adequate remedial scheme).
137 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (upholding federal court order enjoining Attorney general of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce state statute that allegedly violated 14th Amendment).
' Id. at 159-60. The court held that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official
who acts unconstitutionally cannot be acting in an official capacity. Id. at 160.
1' Id. at 164-66. Although the only relief sought in Young was injunctive, most authors agree
that the objections to the Court's decision in Chisholm was a result of the poor financial posture
of the states attempting to protect their empty treasuries after the Revolutionary War or risk
collapse from suits for monetary damages by private citizens. See generally Marshall, supra note
93, at 1365.
'" Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
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question whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity (save in Union Gas)."'' The Court seems to admit this is a
novel issue and adheres close to the philosophy that they must consider
the question "with fidelity to [a] century old doctrine."'42 The Court
was in error to use Hans and Cohens as support for its decision. They
are misplaced and antiquated decisions in the current scheme of
American justice. The Court's reliance on decisions that do not
represent the principle of government being answerable to the citizenry
reflects the inability of the Court to step away from a long lineage of
erroneous jurisprudence and apply justice in an objective fashion. The
Seminole Tribe case challenged the Court's ability to take a position of
leadership and prevail as a forum that represents the interests of a
modem and ever-changing society.
The Court has never interpreted the Eleventh Amendment literally.
Many statutes have stated obvious intentions, only to be interpretatively
questioned and twisted by the Court. The Eleventh Amendment is no
exception. It has been recognized as an example of the "determinate"
text, whose meaning is so abundantly clear as to render interpretation
unnecessary. 43 On it's face the Amendment only limits the extension
of "judicial power of the United States... to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State."'"
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear language of the Amendment, no
decision of the Court has held that the words of the Amendment mean
exactly what they say. Majority and dissenting opinions have exercised
the opportunity to rewrite the Amendment in accordance with historical
intent, ideology and policy. Although the Seminole Tribe Majority
states that the minority is essentially paranoid that environmental and
other areas of law are at risk, there can be no mistake that the Court
specifically overruled Union Gas, a case dealing directly with
CERCLA and key environmental concerns.'45 Further, if the Court is
naive enough to believe that powerful arguments cannot be fashioned
from its decision-arguments that will affect all areas of sovereign
immunity and private enforcement-then there is even greater cause for
concern.
... Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1129.
142 Id.
141 Marshall, supra note 93, at 1349.
'" U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
14 See supra note 62 for a discussion of the Union Gas decision.
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